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Abstract
According to hedonic pricing theory (HPT) market forces operate on individual characteris-
tics of a good, and the price of a product is the aggregate of the price across those charac-
teristics. The relationship between price and characteristics remains poorly understood
because characteristic qualities are hard to quantify, people have varying levels of informa-
tion about characteristics, and people have heterogeneous preferences over characteris-
tics. By analyzing data from a large, market-driven virtual world we are able to test HPT,
while largely avoiding these pitfalls. We find that a linear model with functional characteris-
tics predicts the prices poorly, but a log-linear model performs quite well. Adding social char-
acteristics to this log-linear model improves the predictions substantially. This work strongly
supports HPT and demonstrates a “rational” calculus including social value.
Introduction
The canonical model for the determination of the price of an economic good is that of supply
and demand, where market dynamics establish an equilibrium price at which aggregate
demand is equal to aggregate supply. While useful in many situations, it is difficult to apply the
supply and demand model to the price differences observed among differentiated goods hav-
ing multiple interacting qualities. For this reason it is necessary to move the focus of analysis
from the supply and demand of goods to the supply and demand of qualities of those goods.
Hedonic pricing theory
In a seminal paper, Rosen proposed a model called hedonic pricing theory (HPT) that
describes the workings of a market for differentiated goods [1–3]. In this model, the price of a
product is the aggregate of the price consumers are willing to pay for each quality characteristic
of said product. As a consequence, products with more desirable characteristics command
higher prices than products that are perceived to be of lower aggregate quality. HPT is used in
markets such as wine [4–6], housing [7–9], art [10, 11], cars [12], and agriculture [13]. But
despite this widespread use and the clear formal structure of the theory, the econometric







Citation: Hoefman K, Bramson A, Schoors K,
Ryckebusch J (2018) The impact of functional and
social value on the price of goods. PLoS ONE 13
(11): e0207075. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0207075
Editor: Valerio Capraro, Middlesex University,
UNITED KINGDOM
Received: June 20, 2018
Accepted: October 24, 2018
Published: November 12, 2018
Copyright: © 2018 Hoefman et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
listed in the paper and its Supporting Information
files.
Funding: This research was supported by the
Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) under Grant
Number G018115N and Bijzonder
Onderzoeksfonds BOF2452014000402. The
funders had no role in study design, data collection
and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of
the manuscript.
Competing interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
relationship between quality and price is still not well understood due to difficulties acquiring
the proper data.
While accurate information on product prices is often readily available, reliable quality
information is much harder to obtain. Challenges can be summarized into six main categories.
First, one would have to be able to identify all the relevant quality factors, since an underspeci-
fied model would give inaccurate predictions. Second, some quality factors (such as terroir for
wine) are almost impossible to quantify. Third, consumers tend to have heterogeneous prefer-
ences, implying that what constitutes a quality factor for some may be irrelevant to the pur-
chasing decision of others. Fourth, consumers may not only have preferences over goods’
functional qualities, but also over their social qualities such as prestige and exclusivity (see fur-
ther). These are often idiosyncratic, hard to measure, or even unobservable. Fifth, consumers
may have preferences over goods’ perceived social externalities such as environmentally
friendly goods [14, 15], non-GMO goods [16], organic goods [17, 18], fair trade goods [19],
etc. Social norms conferred via descriptive or injunctive signals [20] may lead them to believe
these goods are morally superior. Recent research [21, 22] shows individual preferences may
depend on the framing of available options as moral or immoral. Sixth, consumers with
imperfect information may fail to correctly assess quality, either because they don’t have the
necessary expertise or because the cost of obtaining the information is too high. These factors
make real-world data on quality very noisy at best, rendering it difficult to pick up a pattern
even if it is present. While this is unavoidable because the world is a complex place, it also
means that it is difficult to test HPT (like many other economic and social theories) using real
world data.
If it were possible to obtain perfect information about the quality for a range of products of
a differentiated good, one could create a model to determine whether HPT explains the rela-
tionship between those qualities and prices. Identifying such a relationship would offer solid
support for HPT as a scientific theory. And in doing so, it could provide strong evidence of
consumer rationality [23] by demonstrating that the expenditure of resources can be strictly
explained by the underlying quality of the purchased good. However, applying this degree of
scientific scrutiny towards HPT has been thus far impossible.
Towards this end we analyze the less noisy environment of a virtual world called Eve
Online. Virtual worlds are computer-based environments offering unique opportunities for
testing economic and social theories [24, 25] due to the following properties: (1) a computer
keeps track of the state of everything that populates it; (2) properties of items are precisely
defined; (3) data is available about the entire population of participants; (4) all participants can
be given access to all relevant details, (5) players can act in a situation of (almost) perfect infor-
mation; (6) participants tend to have more homogeneous preferences over the quality charac-
teristics because virtual worlds are invariably simpler than the real world; and (7) perceived
moral qualities of a good are not expected to play any role given the general amoral nature
of the environment. Although most games are too simple to provide support for such an
endeavor, some large-scale virtual worlds embody dynamics that are representative of the
behavior we would like to study in the real world.
A virtual laboratory
Eve Online (EVE) is an open-ended Massively Multiplayer Online Game set in a science fic-
tion universe created by Icelandic company CCP Games in 2003. More than 500,000 players
compete for resources and territory while engaging in a variety of professions and activities
including mining, manufacturing, trading, piracy, exploration, and combat, both versus the
environment and against other players. As a sandbox game [26], EVE provides its players with
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a virtual world and the tools to explore, but players have the freedom to choose what, when,
and how to approach the available content, including the purchase and sale of goods.
EVE contains 12,709 distinct items that can be bought and sold between players including
ships, ship modules, minerals, ammunition, blueprints, and many more. The items available
and their characteristics (which players can view at any time at zero cost) are decided by CCP
and only rarely adjusted. Market prices, on the other hand, are endogenously determined by
the market behavior of players via a double auction system that matches buy orders with sell
orders. Prices fluctuate daily around a mostly stable base (see Fig 1). Players can buy and sell
anywhere in the virtual universe, but for reasons of efficiency market activity tends to cluster
in hubs. Two thirds of all market transactions are conducted in a single central trading hub.
Items and resources in the game are bought and sold with an in-game currency called the
Inter-Stellar Kredit (ISK). Players earn ISK as a reward for engaging in activities such as defeat-
ing pirates, running missions, selling resources gained through mining, selling goods made
through industry, offering services like courier contracts or protection to other players, or by
paying real-world money. Most players spend time in the game earning ISK to purchase ships,
modules, skills, etc. Advanced players even pay for their game subscription through their in-
game earnings. One billion ISK is roughly equivalent to $15 USD in the period of our analysis.
Because ISK has both in-game and real-world value, and because losses in EVE are permanent,
players tend to be risk averse, and this fosters realistic economic behavior.
Our analysis focuses on ship modules (henceforth ‘modules’) such as weapons and defen-
sive systems that can be fitted onto ships to improve their performance. In line with the termi-
nology of Rosen, a module class contains all module varieties of the same type. There are 296
different module classes in EVE. Of these we select the 20 most traded based on total market
revenue for modules in 2015 (equivalent to approximately 12 million USD, 2015 is a typical
year in the Eve universe), representing 35% of total module revenue. We filter out 4 of these
because the game designers changed their characteristics during 2015. The remaining 16 mod-
ule classes contain between 14 and 43 varieties, for a total of 396 distinct modules in our analy-
sis. These modules bestow 1 or 2 benefits (Armor, Shield, Damage, Range and/or Strength)
where a higher value implies a better item and add between 0 and 3 constraints (CPU, Power
Fig 1. Time series of the natural log (ln) of prices in the main trading hub in 2015 for each of the 21 varieties of
the module class Ballistic Control System. Module prices are subject to supply and demand dynamics but maintain
an overall stable price ranking. Diagrams for other items are available in the Supplemental Information.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207075.g001
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and/or Energy) where a lower value implies a better item, depending on the class. As a conse-
quence the total number of functional quality characteristics for each module class varies from
a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5. This heterogeneity in the number of explanatory variables
prevents us from analyzing the price of all modules within a single regression.
HPT predicts that modules with higher values for the benefits should be more expensive,
whereas higher values for the constraints should result in a lower price. In light of the observed
price consistency (recall Fig 1), we take the mean of the average daily price in the main trading
hub over 2015 as the reference price for each module. Table 1 shows the characteristics and in-
game reference prices for each variety of our running example module class: it has a single
benefit (Damage) and a single constraint (CPU). Characteristics and prices for all module clas-
ses can be found in the Supplemental Information. The information in these tables is available
to players in the game at all times.
Pricing models with functional quality
HPT is agnostic about the functional form of the relationship between price and quality [27,
28]. For example, while people who aren’t trained economists (and many who are) intuitively
expect a linear relationship such that a product twice as good in overall quality would also be
twice as expensive [29, 30], several empirical hedonic pricing studies have found that nonlinear
forms typically perform better than the linear relationship (see [5] for an overview). It is well
understood that the functional form is critical to the accuracy and consistency of the econo-
metric model [31–33], so here we explore both a linear and non-linear relationships between
price and quality.
Table 1. Properties and mean of the daily average price in 2015 of all 21 varieties in the example module class.
Module Name Functional Qualities Social Qualities Price (ISK)
Damage (+%) CPU MetaGroup Rarity
1 Ballistic Control System I 15.02 35 Tech I = 1 1 65 968
2 Cross-linked Bolt Array I 16.59 37 Tech I = 1 3 346 039
3 Ballistic Control System II 21.55 40 Tech II = 2 1 816 551
4 Muon Coil Bolt Array I 18.16 39 Tech I = 1 3 816 602
5 Multiphasic Bolt Array I 19.74 40 Tech I = 1 3 2 139 204
6 ‘Pandemonium’ Ballistic Enhancement 21.33 42 Tech I = 1 3 11 818 778
7 Ballistic ‘Purge’ Targeting System I 18.25 30 Storyline = 3 4 26 122 686
8 ‘Full Duplex’ Ballistic Targeting System 19.35 30 Storyline = 3 4 36 102 807
9 Domination Ballistic Control System 21.55 28 Faction = 4 3 50 382 156
10 Republic Fleet Ballistic Control System 21.55 28 Faction = 4 4 55 074 387
11 Caldari Navy Ballistic Control System 24.31 24 Faction = 4 2 92 894 448
12 Dread Guristas Ballistic Control System 24.31 24 Faction = 4 3 94 448 681
13 Khanid Navy Ballistic Control System 24.31 24 Faction = 4 4 127 593 395
14 Mizuro’s Modified Ballistic Control System 22.10 31 Officer = 6 4 435 538 765
15 Hakim’s Modified Ballistic Control System 22.66 34 Officer = 6 4 444 063 110
16 Gotan’s Modified Ballistic Control System 23.21 36 Officer = 6 4 561 835 333
17 Tobias’ Modified Ballistic Control System 23.76 39 Officer = 6 4 945 333 333
18 Kaikka’s Modified Ballistic Control System 25.00 26 Officer = 6 4 1 137 267 911
19 Thon’s Modified Ballistic Control System 25.69 29 Officer = 6 4 1 900 513 954
20 Vepas’ Modified Ballistic Control System 26.38 31 Officer = 6 4 4 023 867 247
21 Estamel’s Modified Ballistic Control System 27.07 34 Officer = 6 4 10 021 052 707
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207075.t001
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For each of the 16 module classes in our dataset we analyze the degree to which prices
within the module class are explained by the relevant functional quality characteristics using
ordinary least squares regression. We also test for a log-linear relationship by using the natural
logarithm of the price as the dependent variable. This process yields two sets of equations relat-
ing the price Pi of each module in class i 2 {1, 2, . . ., 16} to the benefits and constraints of its
1� ni� 5 functional quality characteristics Fij:
Pi ¼ ai þ
Xni
j¼1
bijFij ðLinear Functional QualityÞ; ð1Þ
lnPi ¼ ai þ
Xni
j¼1
bijFij ðLog   Linear Functional QualityÞ: ð2Þ
Here, the coefficient αi captures any systematic contributions to price that cannot be attrib-
uted to the quality parameters included in the model.
In the Supplementary Materials we present the goodness of fit for all 16 module classes in
terms of the coefficient of determination R2 (the proportion of the variance in the predicted
module price, Pi or ln Pi, that is predictable from the independent variables). We also provide
two alternate measures to compare the performance of competing models: the adjusted R2 and
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), an entropy-based metric where a lower value indi-
cates a better fit [34]. In order to assess the overall performance of the models we average the
performance measures across all 16 modules. These results are summarized in Table 2.
We find that the log-linear model captures the contribution of quality to price rather well.
Averaged across all 16 modules, the log-linear model explains 79.5% of the variance in prices
as measured by R2, and the coefficients of the quality characteristics consistently have the cor-
rect sign (positive for benefits, negative for constraints). The linear model doesn’t perform
nearly as well, with an average R2 of 49.6% and coefficients that often have the wrong sign.
Fig 2 plots the standardized residuals of the fitted values versus residuals. The values are
divided by the standard deviation of prices within each module class. The linear model pre-
dicts negative prices, and the residuals demonstrate uncaptured dynamics and sometimes
errors larger than the fitted values themselves. The predicted values of the log-linear model,
however, are in range with the actual observed prices, and the residuals are randomly distrib-
uted (meaning the model is correctly specified).
The contribution of social value
So far our pricing models have only considered functional quality: those characteristics that
affect the (objective) performance of a product. Our dataset includes module classes with mul-
tiple items having identical functional qualities (e.g., modules 9-10 and 11-13 in Table 1).
Often, large price differences occur between these functionally identical modules; for example,
players pay a surplus of 37% for module 13 over 11 for no functional benefit. Furthermore
Table 2. Performance of the four pricing models averaged across the 16 module classes.
Pricing model R2 adjusted R2 AIC
linear functional quality (Eq 1) 49.6% ± 21.6% 42.5% ± 22.7% 1076.4 ± 356.8
log-linear functional quality (Eq 2) 79.5% ± 10.3% 75.9% ± 12.4% 95.8 ± 27.7
log-linear functional + social quality (Eq 3) 95.35% ± 2.77% 93.76% ± 4.12% 63.26 ± 20.47
log-linear functional + social quality (Eq 4) 95.42% ± 2.95% 93.93% ± 3.83% 61.84 ± 23.84
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207075.t002
Functional and social value and the price of goods
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207075 November 12, 2018 5 / 12
module 17 is functionally inferior to modules 11-13, yet its price is an order of magnitude
higher. These discrepancies seem to refute the core concept of HPT. If the price of a product is
the aggregate of what people are willing to pay for the individual quality factors of said prod-
uct, then modules with identical quality characteristics should command the same price. That
is, unless we accept that other, non-functional characteristics have value too.
The frequent occurrence of modules with identical functional properties commanding
different prices in our dataset allows us to isolate what has been termed “conspicuous con-
sumption” in the literature. The willingness to pay extra for no discernible benefit was first
described by Veblen [35] in 1899 as a way for the rich to demonstrate their wealth. Whether it
is rational to pay for no added functional benefit is a controversial topic in economics even
today. The more classical explanation is one of competition for status goods via the expendi-
ture of wealth [36, 37] which can lead to negative consumption effects [38, 39]. Interestingly, it
is often those earning the least that spend the greatest fraction of their income on conspicuous
consumption [40, 41]. The motivation for engaging in conspicuous consumption is classically
explained by the comparative advantages obtained from (increased) social status, such as sex-
ual selection [42]. But more recent research reveals that psychological aspects like identity
[43], social belonging [44] and self-esteem [45, 46] also play a role. We use the term social
value to refer to benefits that are derived from the social confirmation of a consumer’s ability
to pay. Since social value exists in the interaction with other people, only characteristics that
Fig 2. Comparison between the standardized predictions of the linear functional quality pricing model (top) and
the log-linear functional quality pricing model (bottom) colored by module class (16 in total).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207075.g002
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can be observed by others are candidates for this type of consumption. In EVE all modules
share two characteristics that are observable by all players yet add no functional benefit to the
module.
The first social variable is the Rarity of the module, which can be observed by looking at
market volumes. Any positive effect of rarity on prices within a class of differentiated products
cannot be attributed to the dynamics of supply and demand alone. When two products are
identical in quality yet different in price, rational buyers should always prefer the cheaper alter-
native. This would cause demand to shift to the cheaper substitute, until an equilibrium is
reached where both prices are the same even though their supply may be different. Economists
refer to this as the non-arbitrage condition of any economic equilibrium [47]. If rarity is found
significant for the price while controlling for functional quality, it implies that item’s rarity
confers social value to its owner.
The second social variable, the module’s so-called MetaGroup, appears as a color-coded
marker on items informing players about how the item enters the game. There are six catego-
ries of MetaGroup with increasing exclusivity (MGi): Tech I (for the most basic modules),
Tech II, Storyline, Faction, Deadspace, and Officer (the most exclusive). The meta groups are
correlated with functional quality by design (see Table 1); however, this correlation varies
considerably across characteristics and module classes, and significant functional quality over-
laps occur across metagroups. Specifically, we even have 39 pairs of modules from different
metagroups with identical functional characteristics, thus creating a natural experiment for the
role of social value.
By analyzing price differences for these functionally identical pairs we find that people pay
at least 2 times, and on average 7 times, more for an identical module in a higher MetaGroup.
This price difference can only be understood as a social value premium: players pay for the
social status of an item in addition to (or apart from) how good the item actually is in terms of
functional quality.
Pricing models with functional and social quality
Here we test the importance of the social variables along with the functional ones using econo-
metric models of HPT.
To do this we incorporate the social quality characteristics in our pricing model by adding
variables that capture their rarity and metagroup membership. To measure the contribution of
rarity, we define the variable Rarity Ri using a logarithmic binning technique based on its aver-
age daily market volume (v) during 2015. Modules with the lowest rarity (i.e., v� 10000) are
assigned R = 0, 10000 > v� 1000! R = 1, 1000> v� 100! R = 2, 100> v� 10! R = 3,
and v< 10! R = 4. We measure the contribution of MetaGroup MGi with a discrete variable
ranging from 1 (Tech I) to 6 (Officer) of increasing exclusivity as described above.
Adding parameters Ri and MGi to our purely functional log-linear model (2), we obtain the
log-linear social pricing model in Eq 3. We test the robustness of this log-linear model with an
alternative model where the contribution of each MetaGroup value is measured with a separate
dummy variable MGik (except for the lowest category which is captured by the regression con-
stant αi). This alternative model is shown in Eq 4.
ðLog‐linear Functionalþ Social Quality; v1Þ
lnPi ¼ ai þ
Xni
j¼1
bij Fij þ gi Ri þ di MGi ;
ð3Þ
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ðLog‐linear Functionalþ Social Quality; v2Þ
lnPi ¼ ai þ
Xni
j¼1





We find that the pricing model from Eq 3 that accounts for both functional value and social
value explains 95.35% ± 2.77% of the observed price variance across all 16 module classes com-
pared to 79.5% ± 10.3% for the purely functional models (see Table 2).
Adjusted R2 and AIC (from 95.8 to 63.26) confirm that the addition of the social value
parameters improves the performance of the model considerably. The results from the model
in Eq 4 are nearly identical. Fig 3 illustrates this by comparing the fitted values of the log-linear
model with the actual price observations for two example module classes. Table 2 summarizes
the results while individual regression results for each module class are shown in the Supple-
mentary Materials. Fig 4 shows the improvement in fit for the log-linear model across all mod-
ules and module classes by adding social quality to the model by plotting their normalized
residuals.
Isolating social quality
Recall that in an HPT regression, the total price of an item is broken down into the contribu-
tions of the parameters that are included in the model. In Eq 3 (where MGi is represented by a
discrete variable) the effects of Rarity and MetaGroup on the total price can be isolated with
95% confidence in 8 of the 16 regressions. For these 8 module classes we employ the estimated
coefficients to derive the individual contributions from each of the functional characteristics,
rarity and the meta group, to the (natural log of the) predicted module price. For the model in
Eq 4 we use the averages of the estimated coefficients for each of the MetaGroup values.
From Fig 5 it is clear that not only does social value contribute substantially to prices, but
also that the relative contribution of social value to the price tends to rise with the more exclu-
sive items (as should be expected). This provides clear support for the claim that social value is
economically relevant and demonstrates that the economic value of these social qualities can
be assessed through the lens of HPT.
Fig 3. Comparison between observed prices (grey), predicted prices from the log-linear model including only functional
value (red, Eq 2) and predicted prices from the log-linear model also including social value (blue, Eq 3). Left: prices from the
Ballistic Control System class shown in Table 1 increase exponentially (here drawn in their natural logarithm), and this is
captured accurately by the log-linear model including social value. Right: the 25 modules in the Large Shield Booster class exhibit
flat prices till module 4, a sharp rise in prices between modules 4 and 8, and a smooth exponential rise from module 10 onwards.
The log-linear model including social value captures these features relatively accurately.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207075.g003
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Conclusions
The question of whether Hedonic Pricing Theory can predict the prices of items within a class
of differentiated goods is ultimately about consumer rationality. In previous studies imperfect
information, market failures, heterogeneous preferences, and other factors have complicated
the proper empirical testing of HPT. We circumvent these shortcomings by analyzing eco-
nomic data from a very rich and market-driven virtual world.
Our analysis reveals that consumers appraise the social quality of a product in the same gen-
eral way as its functional quality: incremental increases in the social quality of a product lead
to exponential increases in the price consumers are willing to pay for the good embodying
those qualities. The extremely good fit of the log-linear social quality pricing model provides
Fig 4. Comparison of the purely functional and social value log-linear models. Residuals of the log-linear model
with (Eq 3) and without (Eq 2) social value parameters across all modules. The predicted values and residuals are
standardized by dividing by the standard deviation within each module class. The addition of the social quality
parameters clearly improves the accuracy of the model. On the right hand side we plot the full distribution of the
standardized residuals of both models.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207075.g004
Fig 5. Contribution of the functional value (Fij) and the social value (rarity Ri and meta group MGi) to the (natural log of
the) predicted price, organized per MetaGroup. Left: contribution according to the model in Eq 3. Right: contribution
according to the model in Eq 4. Red and blue are the contributions of Ri and MGi based on the estimated coefficients for these
social quality parameters. Yellow is the part of the predicted module price that is unexplained by the social quality characteristics
Ri and MGi and is therefore attributed to functional characteristics Fij.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207075.g005
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strong support for HPT as an explanation for the prices of products within a class of differenti-
ated goods.
This has important implications for economic theory and practice. Economy theory sug-
gests that firm investments in branding in part signal the firm’s willingness to engage in a long
term relationship with its clients and therefore in equilibrium reduces the information asym-
metry about the product’s quality on the part of the consumers, rendering them more willing
to pay a price mark-up. This argument has lead observers to predict that the ongoing digital
revolution, by reducing information asymmetries between firms and consumers, would erode
the value of brands and shrink price mark-ups. We show that social value considerations make
consumers value labels even if they have incentives to behave rationally and their information
is complete. This may inform further theoretical advances on the deeper drivers of social value
and suggests that top brands’ price mark-ups may well survive the digital revolution, because
their value hinges not only on the presence of information asymmetries, but also on social
value.
Finally we may also conclude that consumers, if equipped with the proper information and
incentives, tend to be very rational in their price decisions, as long as we properly account for
social quality in addition to the purely functional quality of a product. After all, humans are
social animals, so it should come as no surprise that social value is real value, too.
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